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Authenticity, Intersubjectivity and the Ethics of Changing Sex 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper examines how specific concepts of the self shape discussions about the ethics of 
changing sex. Specifically, it argues that much of the debate surrounding sex change has 
assumed a model of the self as authentic and / or atomistic, as demonstrated by both 
contemporary medical discourses and the recent work of Rubin (2003). This leads to a 
problematic account of the ethical issues involved in the decision to change sex. It is 
suggested that by shifting to a properly intersubjective and performative model of the self we 
can better understand (a) the diagnosis of transsexuality; and (b) issues of success, failure and 
regret with regard to changing sex. I also reveal the important implications this shift has for 
how the relationship between medical practitioners and trans individuals is understood. The 
paper concludes by showing how the model of the self as authentic can individualise identity 
and downplay or overlook the tight intertwinement between self and other. A properly 
intersubjective, performative concept of the gendered self places other people at the centre of 
both an individual’s attempt at self-transformation and the ethical issues that arise during this 
process. 
 
 
The Role of Authenticity in Debates about Transsexuality 
 
The trope of “authenticity” is a common means for making sense of and relating to one’s 
identity. As Taylor has documented, the “inward turn” of Western subjectivity has led to the 
modern idea that self-fulfilment or self-realisation amounts to ‘being true to myself… being 
true to my own originality, and that is something only I can articulate and discover’ (Taylor, 
1991, p. 31; cf. Taylor, 1989). This idea of an authentic identity is prevalent in many 
accounts of transsexuality. For example, the autobiographical accounts and self-narratives of 
transsexuals often invoke the idea of a “true self” or “authentic selfhood” in making sense of 
their embodied experiences and attempts at self-transformation (e.g. Bolin, 1988; Brown and 
Rounsley, 1996; Ekins, 1997; Gagne et al. 1997; Mason-Schrock, 1996; Morris, 1974). The 
gendered self is often presented as something inner, fixed and persisting, which connects with 
the widespread idea that the transsexual’s identity has been fixed within them from birth. 
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Identifying and realising this authentic self is often seen as central to becoming a “whole” or 
fully “real” person (Morris, 1974).  
 
The notion of an authentic sex/gender identity also underpins dominant medico-legal models 
of transsexuality. For example, the UK’s Gender Recognition Act (GRA), which grants 
applicants official recognition of their desired gender, contains the requirement that the 
applicant ‘intends to live in the acquired gender until death’ (GRA, 2004). This assumes that 
one’s sex/gender identity is fixed and stable, which supports the idea of an authentic self. 
Relatedly, Sharpe (2002) notes that many court cases which involve establishing the sex of an 
individual have reverted to a “present from birth” narrative. This narrative assumes the 
existence of an “authentic” sex, which is determined chromosomally and/or hormonally and 
deemed to be fixed and stable throughout one’s life. Similarly, when dealing with transsexual 
or intersex individuals, it is often assumed that the role of medical clinicians is to establish 
what the “true” sex/gender of the individual actually is (Hird, 2002; Karkazis, 2008). The 
result is that the idea of authenticity generates and/or reinforces ‘the one fundamental belief 
of most transsexual subjects – that the sense of being the other sex is an inborn and therefore 
irrefutable and unchangeable aspect of self’ (Hausman, 1995, p. 153). Within this narrative of 
the self, transitioning to one’s desired sex/gender is a matter of become the person one always 
really was / truly are.  
 
Such a belief is identifiable in the guidance offered by the Gender Identity Research and 
Education Society (GIRES), which states that ‘the issue of one’s gender identification… is 
rooted in the brain, and is… largely determined pre-birth and more or less stable thereafter’ 
(GIRES, 2008, p. 4). This statement also reflects the tendency to search for a biological cause 
and explanation of transsexuality, wherein certain individuals are inescapably “hard wired” to 
be transsexuals (e.g. Bailey, 2003; Ramachandran and McGeoch, 2008).1 Biological 
determinism can underpins a model of “authentic” transsexuality in which “true” transsexuals 
are those who are neurobiologically destined to be so. GIRES (2008: 4) asserts that the latest 
medical and scientific evidence is that transsexuality is ‘strongly associated with unusual 
neurodevelopment of the brain at the fetal stage’.2 Owing to the inescapable demands of 
one’s brain/body, transitioning ‘to live in the gender role dictated by the brain may be the 
                                                 
1 See Elliot (2010) for a compelling critique of such theories.  
2 It is noteworthy that transsexuality is here cast as something “unusual”. This reflects the common but 
problematic assumption that there is something fundamentally “wrong” or “mistaken” about transsexuality, and 
that transsexuals have not developed “properly”. 
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only way forward if they [transsexuals] are to avoid a life of psychological torment’ (ibid: 5). 
Not only should we be worried at the implication that a life of gender ambiguity or 
dissonance is necessarily one of “psychological torment”, the statement also implies a notion 
of sex/gender identity as fixed and persistent throughout one’s life, which generates the 
inescapable need for sex change.  
 
The idea of an authentic sex/gender identity can be valuable insofar as it allows one to 
explain the dissonance between one’s sexed body and one’s sense of sex/gender identity. 
Specifically, the experience of false embodiment can be rendered intelligible by invoking an 
authentic inner gender identity that is misaligned with one’s physical body. This sense of an 
inner authentic sex/gender identity can then be used to justify the demand for hormone 
treatment and sex reassignment surgery (SRS) on the basis that they will allow one to realise / 
manifest one’s authentic identity. However, a number of theorists have cogently argued that 
the idea of an inner, authentic sex/gender identity is problematic and that an alternative model 
for making sense of one’s embodied existence is required (e.g. Butler, 1990; Shapiro, 1991; 
Stone, 1991; Sullivan, 2003). Indeed, despite the importance of authenticity within many 
transsexual narratives, Hird (2002) has suggested that the idea of authenticity has been 
undermined by the increasing dominance of a model of the gendered self as performative. In 
particular, the idea that sex/gender identity is an unstable, performative construct undermines 
the idea of an authentic, core gendered self (Butler, 1990). 
 
In response to the scepticism within feminist and queer theory about the concept of 
authenticity, Rubin (2003) has offered a nuanced defence of the concept for understanding 
and justifying the lives and self-transformations of FTM (female-to-male) transsexuals. 
Rubin (ibid, p. 15) argues that ‘authenticity is a leading principle behind an FTM’s life. FTM 
lives are a search for recognition of the innermost self. What FTMs realize is that their 
innermost selves are authentically male. Once they make this realization, they modify their 
bodies to express this authentic identity’. Not only does authenticity ground one’s self-
understanding, it also provides the political impetus for justifying sex change: ‘By mobilizing 
the cultural connections between identity and embodiment, FTM men address the 
misrecognition of their authentic selves. This “authenticated” self provides the moral 
foundation for securing the democratic rights and obligations these men deserve’ (ibid).  
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As noted above, the concept of authenticity implies that one’s sex/gender identity is 
something inner, fixed and stable. This idea is echoed by the participants in Rubin’s study, 
many of whom ‘believe they have always been men, despite their female bodies’ (ibid, p. 
143). Consequently, ‘Their transitions are only a means of making their core identities visible 
and recognizable to the public. This points to the importance of expressive identities. An 
expressive identity is a core gender that is situated inside oneself, a gendered soul. Bodies are 
an expression of that core self’ (ibid, p. 145). The result of this understanding of the gendered 
self is that the transsexuals in Rubin’s study believe that ‘they are becoming the men they 
always already were’ (ibid, p. 153) and hence they ‘acknowledged the immutability of their 
male identities and pursued the surest way available in this culture to achieve recognition for 
who they were deep down’ (ibid, p. 182). Along similar lines GIRES (2008, p. 5) refers to the 
transsexual’s dilemma as being constituted by a fundamental conflict between inhabiting 
one’s socially-imposed gender identity and knowledge of one’s inner, true gender identity. 
The difficulty of this ‘charade of presenting themselves as something they know they are not’ 
means that they must change sex in order ‘to be complete, whole people and to live in 
accordance with their internal reality’ (ibid).  
 
Whilst I think that Rubin’s work makes valuable contributions to contemporary discussions 
of transsexuality, I worry that his emphasis on authenticity can lead to an overly 
individualised, atomistic account of identity which in turns distorts the ethical issues involved 
in changing sex. Thus, rather than challenge the phenomenological experiences of 
transsexuals, I want to consider how adopting a properly intersubjective and performative 
model of the gendered self allows us to rethink (a) the diagnosis and treatment of 
transsexuality; and (b) how issues of success, failure and regret are understood and responded 
to. This, I argue, provides a richer, more complex and nuanced account of the ethics of 
changing sex, which is fully attendant to the issues of responsibility and responsiveness that 
follow from the social nature of the self. It also reveals ways in which the clinical diagnosis, 
treatment and understanding of transsexuality can be improved.  
 
 
From an Authentic to an Intersubjective Self  
 
One problem with the notion of authenticity is that it can lead to a model of the self, and an 
account of one’s sex/gender identity, as being inwardly discovered rather than 
5 
intersubjectively constituted. The idea of the self as intersubjectively constructed dovetails 
neatly with the shift from an authentic to a performative model of identity. Spearheaded by 
Butler’s work (e.g. Butler, 1990; 2004) and central to many contemporary forms of feminist, 
queer and trans theory (e.g. Benjamin, 1998; Ferguson, 1993; Lloyd, 2005; Lorraine, 1999; 
McNay, 2000; Phelan, 1994), the concepts of performativity and intersubjectivity capture the 
idea that one’s identity and sense of self are constituted socially through a complex 
intertwinement of social discourses, practices and patterns of recognition. Understanding the 
self as intersubjective thus captures three important features of identity: (i) it is socially 
constructed rather than inwardly discovered or generated; (ii) it is neither fixed nor 
necessarily unified or coherent; (iii) it is not something inner and private that be known solely 
through a process of introspection (McQueen, 2015).  
 
In terms of transsexuality, this suggests that one’s sex/gender identity is not something 
persistent and present-from-birth. Rather, one’s sense of self is a process of continual 
becoming that is constructed through interaction with others as well as socio-institutional 
practices and discourses, and thus incomplete, fragmented and continually evolving. This 
implies the sense of false embodiment central to many transsexual narratives cannot be 
grounded in the belief that one was born and has always been a “man” or a “woman”, for 
such identities are only developed through time as they are intersubjectively and 
performatively shaped. The problem with narratives of transsexuality that emphasise 
authenticity and inwardly generated identity is that they can downplay or simply overlook the 
extent to which our capacity to understand and shape ourselves is dependent upon the wider 
social context in which we are situated.  
 
It is noteworthy that even those theorists who highlight the performative or constructed 
nature of identity can nevertheless present a problematic account of the gendered self as 
inwardly-generated. For example, Kate Bornstein’s influential defence of sex change stresses 
the fact that gender is fluid and ambiguous, which means that each of us has ‘the ability to 
freely and knowingly become one or many of a limitless number of genders, for any length of 
time, at any rate of change. Gender fluidity recognizes no borders or rules of gender’ 
(Bornstein, 1994, p. 51-2). Similarly, Feinberg (1998, p. 24) argues that each ‘person’s 
expression of their gender or genders is their own and equally beautiful. To refer to anyone’s 
gender expression as exaggerated is insulting and restricts gender freedom’. Feinberg (ibid, p. 
53) claims that we should have complete liberty to explore and alter our sex and gender in 
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any way we want, asserting that everyone has ‘the right to express their gender in any way 
that feels most comfortable’. 
 
Both Bornstein and Feinberg appear to invoke an atomistic concept of the self in which one’s 
sex/gender identity is a matter of voluntaristic self-creation rather than social constitution. 
For example, Bornstein (1994, p. 40) claims that ‘Gender identity is a form of self-definition: 
something into which we can withdraw, from which we can glean a degree of privacy from 
time to time’. Similarly, she (ibid, p. 39) declares that ‘I love the idea of being without an 
identity, it gives me a lot of room to play around; but it makes me dizzy, having nowhere to 
hang my hat. When I get too tired of not having an identity, I take one on: it doesn’t really 
matter what identity I take on, so long as it’s recognizable’. However, it is not the case that 
we can simply “take on” or “take off” an identity at will, and it is unclear what it means to be 
“without” an identity. Thus, it is incoherent to assert that we are entirely free to don a gender 
identity in a way analogous to an actor taking on a particular character or a new costume. As 
Heyes (2006, p. 278) notes, ‘None of us are at liberty to become any kind of person we want, 
and to align oneself with a particular identity formation is a necessarily intersubjective 
activity’. Identity formation is a social affair: for any of us to properly “have” an identity we 
require others to ascribe that identity to us. 
 
Part of the issue with Bornstein’s account is that she implies that we have full autonomy to 
become any identity we wish. This is the situation of the “gender outlaw” who recognises ‘no 
borders or rules of gender’ (ibid, p. 52). Against this Butler’s account of performativity 
reveals sex/gender identity as both tightly scripted and socially-imposed, meaning that it is 
wedded to constraining norms that place us within an inescapable scene of constraint when 
attempting to fashion an identity we feel comfortable with. Thus, whilst Bornstein and 
Feinberg rightly highlight the fluidity and plurality of gender identities, they nevertheless 
remain tied to the notion of an atomistic self insofar as they present one’s gender identity as 
inwardly generated. This generates an individualist vision of social life, which downplays or 
simply forecloses the essentially intersubjective nature of the self. This, in turn, distorts our 
understanding of the ethical and political issues involved in changing sex. For example, in 
reducing sex change to a matter of an individual’s tastes and preferences, one is in danger of 
rendering sex a purely aesthetic issue. This disconnects sex/gender identities from important 
ethical issues, such as the ways in which certain gender identities (especially masculine 
identities) are entwined with socio-political practices of domination and the effects that our 
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gender-transformations have on those around us (Heyes, 2007). The authentic, atomistic 
model of the self also has problematic effects on the diagnosis and treatment of 
transsexuality, as the following sections reveal.  
 
 
Diagnosis and Demand 
 
Although the precise definition of “transsexuality” is contested, it seems reasonable to assert 
that central to the experiences of many transsexuals is the desire to alter their physical body 
in order to better align it with their internal sense of gendered self. This is often achieved 
through the use of hormones and surgery. Thus, transsexual’s demand for sex change is 
intertwined with the medical diagnosis and treatment of transsexuality. The relationship 
between transsexuals and the medical community is much debated and I do not want to tread 
already well-worn ground here (e.g. Cromwell, 1999; Davy, 2011; Hines, 2007; Meyerowitz, 
2002). Instead, I want to note that the diagnosis of transsexuality is frequently guided by the 
concepts of authenticity and atomism. Specifically, medical practitioners tend to see their 
role in the diagnostic process as a matter of correctly identifying “authentic” 
transsexuals, which is aided by the presence of particular aesthetic markers and the 
structure of transsexual self-narratives (Davy, 2011). This goes hand-in-hand with the 
tendency for medical practitioners and researches to treat sex and gender identity as 
both “real” and fixed (Hird, 2003, p. 183). Hence, the diagnosis of transsexuality is often 
assumed to involve determining the individual’s “true” identity. 
 
A related assumption underlying the diagnostic procedure, and which is often invoked 
in legal rulings involving transsexuals (Sharpe, 2002), is the “present from birth” 
narrative. This states that the desire to change sex has been present from birth, or at 
least early child. Hence, certain forms of childhood behaviour and experiences are 
offered as evidence of a fixed, “authentic” transsexual identity. This helps to establish 
that the transsexual identity is authentic because their desire for sex change is 
“genuine” and not a mere passing fantasy. This tendency to equate authenticity with a 
single, persisting sex/gender identity is further reflected in the medico-legal requirement 
that one intends to spend the rest of one’s life as one’s desired sex/gender (GRA, 2004). 
The result is that an authentic transsexual is someone who has always wanted to live, 
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and will always want to live, as the opposite sex. As Rubin (2003) reports, transsexuals 
have always known who they really are on the inside.  
 
May (2002), a practising psychosexual therapist working in the NHS with transsexual 
and transgender clients, reflects on the challenges involved in employing feminist and 
queer perspectives about the construction of gender within a medical context that rests 
upon ‘a more rigid stability of gender identity’ (ibid, p. 450) and reinforces ‘schemata of 
“real” and “true”’ (ibid, p. 458). She observes that the idea of a stable, unambiguous 
and “true” or “authentic” sex/gender identity is ‘used as a measure of the desirability of 
medical intervention’ (ibid, p. 450), which can work against individuals who eschew 
ideas of inner, persisting, authentic identity (cf. Davy, 2011; Hird, 2003; Whittle et al. 
2008). One reason for this is that therapists and clinicians often ‘equate mental 
“robustness” with notions of the “stable self”’, an unchanging fixed identity’ (May, 
2002, p. 450). Consequently, ‘within such a framework, shifting identities tend to be 
seen as denoting instability and a lack of authenticity’ (ibid), thus rendering individuals 
who experience their identities as such as unsuitable for treatment because they are not 
mentally “robust” enough. 
 
Although the idea of an inner, authentic essence may be phenomenologically real for some 
individuals, it does not fit with the experiences of all (or even most) transsexuals. 
Consequently, using the idea of authentic transsexuality to guide the diagnostic process can 
be problematic for individuals who deviate from the requisite narrative (Cromwell, 1999). As 
Davy (2011, p. 31) notes, this approach can ‘exacerbate transpeople’s oppression by 
compelling them to enact a colonized concept of an ontologically recognized (“authentic”) 
Transsexual identity’. This model is also at odds with a properly intersubjective, performative 
model of the subject in which one’s sense of self is tenuously constructed and reconstructed 
through a series of social negotiations and self-interpretations. We cannot definitely know 
who we are prior to engaging performatively with an identity and thus our sense of self is 
constantly subject to revision. As Hird (2002, p. 587) notes, the ‘problem with authenticity 
arguments is that they do not take sufficient account of gender as an ongoing product of 
interaction’. This means that there is more instability and uncertainty within sex/gender 
identities – and identity more generally – than the model of authenticity allows. To quote 
Davy (2011, p. 29), ‘feminine and masculine embodiment is always in a state of flux and will 
never become stable and fully graspable’.  
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In light of this, it seems appropriate to be cautious of Rubin’s (2003) attempt to reinscribe 
transsexual identities as authentic and inwardly-generated, as this overlooks the complex 
social processes involved in developing and maintaining a sense of gendered self. In 
defending the idea that our inner gender identities are “immutable” (ibid, p. 182) and that 
there is a ‘core gender that is situated inside oneself, a gendered soul’ (ibid, p. 145), Rubin 
works to individualise and internalise identity. For example, he refers to a person’s identity as 
‘the letter buried within them’ (ibid, p. 183), which provides instructions on how to become 
who we are. This is why the participants in Rubin’s study saw themselves as becoming ‘the 
men they always already were’ (ibid, p. 153). One consequence of this picture is that the 
medical diagnosis of transsexuality is assumed to be a matter of accurately identifying the 
inner truth about individuals, rather than representing part of the process by which an 
individual’s identity is intersubjectively and continuously constructed.  
 
However, this diagnostic approach, in which successful diagnosis is aimed at ensuring one’s 
authentic self is realised in/through one’s physical body – ‘bodies are an expression of that 
core self’ (ibid, p. 145) – can reinforce the idea that one knows definitively, and indeed has 
always known definitively, one’s authentic identity. This can undermine those individuals 
who are unsure about their sense of self and/or who want to undergo hormonal or surgical 
treatment in order to cultivate rather than merely reflect a sense of gendered self. Indeed, 
many transsexuals who understand their sex/gender in line with a performative, 
intersubjective model of identity have to tailor their self-narrative when interacting with 
medical professionals in order to ensure that they meet the expectations of what an authentic 
transsexual is (e.g. Davy, 2011; Hines, 2007).  
 
Reflecting on this issue, May (2002, p. 459) notes that current ‘medical discourses and 
practice, along with psychosexual therapy, are ill equipped and lack the confidence to 
create space for the contemplation of confusion and conflicts’. Reflecting on this issue, 
Prosser (1998: 108) concludes that in order ‘to be a transsexual, the subject must be a 
skilled narrator of his or her own life. Tell the story persuasively, and you’ll be likely 
have to your hormones and surgery; falter, repeat, disorder, omit, digress, and you’ve 
pretty much had it’. Consequently, one important challenge for clinical practitioners 
and therapists working with trans individuals during the diagnostic process is to ‘model 
for clients how a sense of unsureness and ambiguity may sometimes be the most 
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appropriate positon for them to adopt’ (May, 2002, p. 459). Until the medical approach 
adopts a more intersubjective, performative model of sex/gender, which sees one’s 
identity as fluid and unstable rather than fixed and real, it will rest upon a problematic 
diagnostic procedure that works against those individuals who deviate from established 
narratives of the “authentic” transsexual. 
 
 
Interpreting Success, Failure and Regret 
 
The role of authenticity in the diagnostic process has an important impact on how notions of 
success, failure and regret are understood with regard to changing sex. As noted above, the 
idea of authenticity tends to go hand-in-hand with the “present from birth” narrative and the 
idea of sex/gender identity as something fixed and stable throughout one’s life. This means 
that the “correct” diagnosis is one that accurately identifies a person’s true identity, which in 
turn works to legitimise hormonal and/or surgical treatment and, ideally, ensure a successful 
outcome. A successful outcome of treatment is one in which the individual has satisfactorily 
realised their inner sex/gender identity, thus resolving the prior sense of gender dysphoria or 
false embodiment. Within this narrative, the experience of regret by an individual who has 
undergone SRS is linked to a failure to accurately diagnose their condition beforehand. 
Consequently, the expectations and management of success, failure and regret are approached 
from a perspective that assumes the transsexual’s self is (a) fully-formed and recognised prior 
to transitioning, and (b) fixed and stable.  
 
This perspective is evident in an assessment of post-transition regret conducted by Olsson 
and Möller (2006). The authors begin by stating that ‘Persistent regret after sex reassignment 
surgery (SRS)… must be considered, along with suicide, as the worst possible outcome of 
SRS’ (ibid, p. 501). Consequently, ‘Every regret case represents a major clinical and ethical 
problem’ (ibid, p. 502). This immediately raises the question of why regret must be 
considered to be “the worst possible outcome” and “a major clinical and ethical problem”. 
Although Olsson and Möller do not offer an explicit answer, the assumption appears to be 
that regret indicates a failure and a mistake: a failure to secure the individual as a stable, 
recognisable gender; a mistake in that it turns out that the person was not really a transsexual 
(or, rather, an authentic / genuine case of transsexuality). However, perhaps the individual 
understood themselves to be transsexual prior to transitioning and in the process of 
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transitioning came to feel that they actually are not, or that their new identity is not what they 
expected / hoped it to be like. This need not be interpreted as either a failure or a mistake, but 
rather indicative of the nature of identity: something that is a constant becoming, a 
continuous process, which can never be entirely controlled or accurately predicted. 
 
Olsson and Möller (ibid, p. 502-3) state that their case report ‘will hopefully contribute to a 
growing body of knowledge that in the future will reduce the number of bad choices for SRS 
and also the number of regret cases’. However, maybe regret and bad choices cannot be 
eradicated or even significantly reduced precisely because one cannot determine what the 
outcome of SRS will be prior to the process itself. This is likely to be the case no matter how 
“authentic” the individual’s gender dysphoria and no matter how accurately this is diagnosed 
by clinicians. Indeed, it is likely to be the case because there is no such thing as an 
“authentic” transsexual (i.e. someone who “really is” a man / woman trapped in a woman’s / 
man’s body). No one, not even the individual undergoing SRS, can know for sure what they 
will be like after transitioning. The position adopted by Olsson and Möller only makes sense 
if one assumes that (a) there is a kernel of transsexual identity present within the individual 
and persists throughout their life, and (b) that this can be correctly identified by therapists and 
doctors – for it is only on the basis of these two conditions that one could eradicate “bad 
choices” and regret by ensuring that only “authentic” transsexuals are given sex reassignment 
surgery. 
 
These issues are identifiable in a number of other clinical studies that try to determine the 
likelihood of success and regret following sex change (e.g. Lawrence, 2003; Smith et al., 
2001; Smith et al., 2005; Landén et al., 1998). Reflecting the concerns of Olsson and Möller, 
Landén et al. (1998: 287) state that ‘Every effort must be made to avoid individuals who ask 
for a reversal of sex reassignment’. Similarly, Smith et al. (2005, p. 90) declare that ‘it is 
imperative to try and prevent post-operative regret’. Finally, Smith et al. (2001, p. 472) note 
that ‘one of the main objections of professionals against a start of the sex reassignment 
procedure before 18 years [of age] is the risk of postoperative regret’. Whilst it seems entirely 
reasonable to aim to minimise regret with regard to sex change, especially considering its 
somewhat irreversible nature, we should resist thinking that regret can be avoided and 
success can be guaranteed so long as only “authentic” transsexuals are offered sex 
reassignment surgery. This is because we cannot know definitively who we are prior to the 
performative engagement with a particular identity, which raises important issues for a 
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medical approach that remains wedded to the idea of one’s gender identity as authentic and 
fixed. As May (2002, p. 460) observes, ‘For the therapist who, having considered the degree 
to which gender is constructed, sees the process of becoming rather than the static position of 
being as that which governs gender identity, the assumptions central to medical discourse 
cease to make adequate sense’.  
 
Davy (2011) and May (2002) note that many transsexuals are posing a challenge to certain 
medical models of gender because they are choosing to stop SRS at different stages. 
Specifically, the fact that certain transsexuals do not deem it necessary to have full SRS 
generates a problem for both diagnosis and “cure”. To quote May (2002, p. 459): 
 
One of the central challenges of transgender metamorphosis for the medical model 
and those working within or alongside its belief system, is that it may well not 
proceed to what have been seen as obvious conclusions, recognizable stopping 
points. Both male-to-female and female-to-male transsexuals may stop short of 
full reassignment, raising problems in occupying a continuum of transgression 
which values fluidity and represents a head-on challenge for medical discourses. 
 
One reason why this is a challenge for the diagnosis of transsexuality is because diagnosis is 
intended to identify “authentic” transsexuals who fit within the narrative of becoming 
unambiguous men or women, which in turn casts the “cure” as achieving stable, 
unambiguous gender identification (Davy, 2011, p. 30). On this model, transsexuals who 
decide to stop SRS would imply a failure of accurate diagnosis. Reflecting on this issue, St. 
Jacques (2007) observes that individuals who, having undergone SRS, decide that they are 
not transsexuals are typically situated by medical practitioners within a narrative of “regret”. 
However, by understanding SRS as process by which a person’s self is constructed rather 
than realised we can better make sense of individuals who choose a more ambiguous 
sex/gender identity. This alternative reading would imply that no “mistake” is made in 
diagnosing an individual as a transsexual who then chooses to remain in a more permanently 
“trans” state. Rather, the process of diagnosis and treatment is a central condition for an 
individual realising their capacity for self-transformation, wherein the individual’s self 
unfolds throughout the process in potentially surprising and uncontrollable ways. 
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Considering the above, it would be beneficial if clinicians viewed the diagnostic 
procedure less as an exercise in accurate, authoritative identification of authentic 
selfhood, and more a central component in helping individuals to realise their capacity 
for continual creative self-fashioning. This would better reflect the always-incomplete, 
performative nature of the gendered self in which “man” and “woman” are each 
understood as ‘a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be 
said to originate or end’ (Butler, 1990, p. 33). To become more ethically sensitive and 
responsive to the idea of gender as a process of intersubjective becoming, the medical 
approach to sex change should acknowledge that the process by which trans individuals 
‘find a voice, a way of being and an emotional performance with which they are 
comfortable, must inevitably incorporate a process of trial and error’ (May, 2002, p. 
458). The problem is that currently ‘there is little margin for error within a medical 
framework that reinforces schemata of “real” and “true”’ (ibid).  
 
The tendency for the medical approach to rest upon the idea of one’s sex/gender as 
inner and fixed can generate a problematic ethical relationship between clinicians and 
transsexuals, wherein clinicians take themselves to be the gatekeepers of medical 
technologies and the guardians of transsexuals whose role is to prevent transsexuals 
making “bad” choices, e.g. choices they will later regret. This not only fosters a 
paternalistic relationship between clinician and trans individual, but it can also 
foreclose a sense of responsibility and responsiveness on the part of clinicians toward 
their clients/patients insofar as they overlook or misunderstand their own important 
role in the process by which the transsexual seeks to construct their self. This is not to 
say that many current clinicians do not genuinely want to the best for their 
clients/patients, and I am sure that they very often care about their welfare. However, 
so long as clinicians see themselves as “curing” trans individuals of an internal 
“problem” or “disorder”, there is the danger that trans identities will continue to be 
pathologised as deviations from healthy sex/gender norms (Hird, 2003; Butler, 2004). 
This will foster ethically questionable relationships between trans individuals and 
members of the medical community, in which the former are cast as miserable, sick or 
unnatural individuals in need of the “cure” offered by medical science.   
 
In light of this, medical practitioners and therapists should be encouraged to reflect on 
how their own gender expectations and perceptions affect their clients’ self-
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understanding and experiences of sex change (Davy, 2011; Whittle et al, 2008;), which 
in turn highlights the need for educating clinicians about trans identities and current 
perspectives on the social construction of gender (May, 2002). In particular, it is 
necessary to challenge the idea that clinicians are the “experts” or authoritative judges 
who properly understand the nature of transsexuality and sex/gender. Rather, it ‘may 
be more productive therapeutically and personally to admit to the very sense of being 
“at sea” on questions of gender and embodiment’ (May, ibid, p. 460). This would help 
clinicians to respond better to the frequent confusions and uncertainties that trans 
individuals can feel about their identities, especially those individuals who do not find 
they easily fit within the gender binary of unambiguous masculinity or femininity. It 
would also move us away from the idea that there is a “true”, “proper” or “correct” 
way of embodying sex/gender norms, which in turns recasts what it means to undergo 
“successful” SRS.  
 
 
The Sociality of the Self 
 
In addition to shaping how we understand success, failure and regret with regard to 
changing sex, our picture of the self also has a strong impact on how we understand our 
ethical relationships with others. One important implication of the intersubjective, 
relational nature of the self is that questions of self-transformation are automatically 
linked to questions about our responsiveness and responsibility to others. This is 
because our attempts to change our own identities can strongly affect the identities of 
others, which implies that we should be ethically sensitive to the ways in which our 
attempts at self-transformation impact those with whom we stand in important 
interpersonal relationships. A problem with conceptions of the self as inner and 
authentic is that they can foreclose such issues by presenting the self as something 
created intra-subjectively rather than intersubjectively. This is evident in both 
Bornstein’s and Feinberg’s defences of sex change outlined above, in which the self is 
presented as atomistic and individually-scripted. Indeed, Heyes (2007, p. 55) notes that 
Feinberg ‘tries to sidestep the ethical field into which one inevitably stumbles when 
talking about the merits of various “gender expressions.” This elision comes from hir 
[sic] willingness to treat gender as an individual matter, rather than as a web of relations 
in ongoing tension and negotiation’.  
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This is why I think we need to be cautious about Rubin’s defence of the idea of authenticity 
within transsexual narratives (Rubin, 2003). The participants in his study consistently 
reported that they ‘have always been men, despite their female bodies’ and thus ‘who they are 
at heart does not change during transition’ (ibid, p. 143). This implies that our encounter with 
others is simply a matter of being recognised for who we already are, rather than a process by 
which our gendered self is constructed. As Rubin (ibid, p. 145) writes, transsexuals’ 
transitions ‘are only a means of making their core gender identities visible and recognizable 
to the public’ (emphasis added). Whilst it seems reasonable to assume that this is part of the 
process of transitioning, I do not think that it can be all there is to it. The reason for this is 
that the very process of transitioning is itself a means by which the self is worked on and 
developed. The self is always in-process, continually being made and unmade through our 
social interactions.  
 
Changing sex thus contains an unavoidable element of unpredictability and 
uncontrollability. To suggest, as Rubin does, that transsexuals have always definitively 
know who they are, and that who they really are does not change during transition, 
implies a stability of the self and capacity for authoritative, introspective self-knowledge 
that belies the fluidity of identity and the opacity of the mind. Butler (2005) suggests 
that the myth of authoritative, absolute self-knowledge underpins problematic ideas of 
self-mastery and sovereign agency that distort our ethical relations with others. By 
acknowledging the limits of self-knowledge, which are a consequence of the 
intersubjective constitution of the self, she argues that we can cultivate an alternative 
ethical relationship with others founded on openness, responsibility, shared 
vulnerability and mutual dependency.  
 
Attending to the intersubjective and performative dimensions of the self also challenges 
Rubin’s idea of a “core gender identity” which resides wholly within the individual and 
which they discover themselves. The sociality of the self means that our gender is, in a 
sense, outside ourselves: ‘What I call my “own” gender appears perhaps at times as 
something that I author or, indeed, own. But the terms that make up one's gender are, 
from the start, outside oneself, beyond oneself in a sociality that has no single author’ 
(Butler, 2004, p. 1). Consequently, my capacity to understand myself ‘is not only socially 
mediated, but socially constructed... In this sense, I am outside myself from the outset’ 
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(ibid, p. 32). A danger with authenticity narratives is that they can cause us to see other 
people as threat to our ability to identify and realise our authentic selves, rather than as 
an inescapable precondition for having a sense of self in the first place. This, in turn, 
can distort the responsibilities and dependences we have with regard to one another in 
virtue of the relational, socially-constituted nature of the self.  
 
One implication of this intersubjective aspect of selfhood is that our attempts at self-
transformation have to be situated within the context of our current personal relationships and 
political discourses in order to see how they affect those around us. Rather than suggesting 
that this provides a reason not to undergo a change of sex, it implies that the decision to 
transition is never made in a social vacuum and never pertains solely to one’s inner, authentic 
self. Arguments for the right to change sex that fail to consider this issue are thus ethically 
problematic, as are diagnostic approaches in which the individual is treated as a social atom 
rather than an intersubjective node. Insofar as we are bound up with the lives of others, we 
have obligations and commitments to them that arise from these relationships (Hines, 2007). 
Of course, many trans individuals are acutely aware of the social dimensions of the self. 
Davy (2011, p. 105) reports that ‘Relationship factors, such as marriage and partnerships, 
were important considerations in decision making processes’. Similarly, Hines (2007) found 
that the decision to transition is often strongly affected by an individual’s family 
relationships. This is particularly the case for older transsexuals who are married with 
children. One participant in Davy’s study went into “remission” for a year in order to save 
her marriage (Davy, 2011, p. 105), whilst Rubin (2003, p. 121) describes a transsexual who 
chose not to transition in order to preserve their marriage.  
 
Whilst some people may see this refusal to transition as a denial of one’s authentic self – 
and hence a betrayal of who one really is – we can also read the decision as an ethically-
informed one that acknowledges the social nature of the self and the claims that certain 
others have on us. Rather than offering definitive arguments for or against changing 
sex, a properly intersubjective model of the self reveals the ethical complexities involved 
in an individual’s choice to change sex, wherein the very notion of an “individual” 
choice is unsettled. What this model does highlight is that one’s decision to change sex 
cannot be justified just because this is who one really, authentically is. There are at least 
two reasons for this. First, one cannot definitively and indubitably know this is who one 
really is prior to the act of transitioning. Second, one’s decision should be made through 
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reference to the social network of relationships within which one exists as a social being. 
In contrast to the authentic and atomistic perspectives on changing sex, the desire and 
decision to transition is not a purely private or personal matter and cannot be justified 
in terms of realising who one really is. Rather, to change sex is also to change one’s 
social relationships, and the decision to transition must be made in full 
acknowledgement of this.  
 
In light of this, it would be useful if the family members and/or friends of individuals 
seeking sex change are encouraged to take part in clinical discussions between medical 
practitioners and transsexuals – subject, of course, to the wishes of the transsexual. I am 
certainly not advocating that other people should necessarily be incorporated into such 
discussions. Rather, we should not automatically assume that the process of changing 
sex is a purely private affair that pertains solely to the individual and their “inner” 
authentic identity. Indeed, given the fact that the support of family and friends strongly 
affects a person’s experience of transitioning, the medical approach to diagnosing and 
treating transsexuality should fully reflect the sociality of the self. Consequently, if we 
are concerned with producing positive outcomes from SRS, then placing others at the 
centre of this process would likely help to achieve this goal. Clinicians should thus work 
to facilitate the inclusion of family and/or friends within their meetings with trans 
individuals. This will help to avoid the assumption – reinforced by current practices of 
diagnosis and treatment – that one’s identity is an individualised, private affair that is 
threatened, rather than constructed, by and through our relations with others. This, in 
turn, can aid the individual seeking sex change to make a properly ethical and informed 
decision, one which truly reflects the sociality of the self.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has explored the ways in which the concepts of authenticity and atomistic identity 
shape contemporary narratives and debates about transsexuality. I have argued that the trope 
of authenticity not only adversely affects the diagnosis and treatment of transsexuality, but 
also generates ethically problematic relationships between clinicians and trans individuals. 
By understanding the gendered self as a continual process of performative becoming, in 
which our identities are intersubjectively constituted, we can (i) revise the procedures for 
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diagnosing and treating transsexuality; and (ii) rethink how the concepts of success, failure 
and regret are understood with regard to sex change.  
 
Shifting from an authentic to a performative, intersubjective model of the self can also alter 
how we understand interpersonal relationships. Rather than see other people as a threat to the 
realisation of our authentic self, by appreciating the sociality of the self we can see one 
another as essential parts of the processes by which our identities are tenuously and often 
unpredictably constructed. It also suggests that we consider the impact that our attempts at 
self-transformation have on those around us. This shift in perspective can foster more 
responsive and responsible interpersonal relationships. Finally, the sociality of the self 
highlights the value in incorporating significant others into clinical discussions about 
changing sex. Such ethical issues can be foreclosed by a model of the self as authentic and 
atomistic, wherein identity is individualised as something intrinsic to the individual. This 
ultimately overlooks the social nature of the gendered self and the ethical issues connected to 
the decision to change sex. 
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